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Configure audit logging, data masking, header injection, the message integrity Interceptor and encryption Interceptors to secure and track data in your Kafka topics.
From our blog: FedRAMP High for Kafka without replatforming Meet FedRAMP High encryption requirements on your existing Kafka, no replatforming.Kafka and HIPAA 2026 What the 2026 HIPAA Security Rule changes for Kafka, and how to close the gaps.

Common configuration

The following configurations are shared across multiple Interceptors:

Environment variables as secrets

To ensure your secrets don’t appear in your Interceptors, you can refer to the environment variables set in your Gateway container. Use the format ${MY_ENV_VAR}. We recommend using this for schema registry or Vault secrets and any other values you’d like to hide in the configuration.

Schema registry

Gateway reads schemas either through an external connection or from configuration on the Interceptor itself.
Schema-encoded records whose schema ID is stored in a record header, the format introduced in Confluent Platform 8.2, require Gateway 3.21.0 or later.
External connections are a preview feature and subject to change. Inline schemaRegistryConfig remains fully supported.
Set schemaRegistryConnectionName to the name of a schema registry external connection, declared once when Gateway starts with variables that follow this pattern:
For a connection declared as GATEWAY_EXTERNAL_CONNECTION_DEFAULT_SR_CONFIG_*, the Interceptor reaches it with:
Set either schemaRegistryConnectionName or schemaRegistryConfig, never both. Gateway rejects a configuration that sets both with 400 Bad Request, rather than silently picking one.Remove a connection an Interceptor already names and the Interceptor stays visible through the API but stops applying to traffic. See what happens at startup.

Audit Interceptor

This Interceptor logs information from API key requests. To use it, inject it and implement ApiKeyAuditLog interface for audit. The currently supported Kafka API requests are:
  • ProduceRequest (PRODUCE)
  • FetchRequest (FETCH)
  • CreateTopicRequest (CREATE_TOPICS)
  • DeleteTopicRequest (DELETE_TOPICS)
  • AlterConfigRequest (ALTER_CONFIGS)
When incremental fetch sessions are enabled, Gateway records a fetch only when the request lists the topics being read, which a consumer stops doing once it settles into steady-state reads. A long-lived consumer can appear idle in audit logs while it keeps consuming. This affects audit visibility only — it doesn’t change the data a consumer receives.

Configure audit Interceptor

Audit Interceptor example

Data masking Interceptor

Field level data masking Interceptor masks sensitive fields within messages as they are consumed.

Configure data masking Interceptor

The policies will be applied when consuming messages.

Data masking policy

Data masking rule

Masking type

  • MASK_ALL: all data will be masked
  • MASK_FIRST_N: the first n characters will be masked
  • MASK_LAST_N: the last n characters will be masked

Error policy

You can control the plugin behavior when it can’t parse a fetched message through its errorPolicy which can be set to fail_fetch or skip_masking.
The error policy only applies to messages that do not have an associated schema. When a message has a schema (Avro, JSON Schema or Protobuf), the plugin uses the schema to parse the message and the error policy is not triggered.
The default is fail_fetch. In this mode, the plugin will return a failure to read the batch which the fetch record is part of, effectively blocking any consumer. In skip_masking mode, if there’s a failure to parse a message being fetched (e.g. an encrypted record or a schemaless message that can’t be parsed), then that record is skipped and returned un-masked.

Full payload encryption compatibility

Data masking is compatible with full payload encryption. When both Interceptors are applied to the same topic, data masking automatically detects records with full payload encryption headers and skips them, preventing deserialization errors that would otherwise occur when attempting to mask encrypted content. Check out the encryption configuration for details. Field level encryption is not affected by this behavior.

Data masking Interceptor example

Secured schema registry

Dynamic header injection Interceptor

This Interceptor injects headers (such as user IP) into records as they pass through Gateway. Use target to choose whether Gateway injects them when clients produce, when they consume, or both. We support templating in this format: X-CLIENT_IP: "{{userIp}} testing".

Choose the produce or consume path

The target setting controls which path the Interceptor runs on. In a future version we will stop defaulting target to PRODUCE and so we log a warning when it is not set. We advise you to set it explicitly. On consume, Gateway adds the headers to the fetch response but does not write them to the topic, so the record in Kafka stays unchanged. With BOTH, Gateway skips a header on consume if the record already has it, so records aren’t tagged twice. Set overrideIfExists to true to inject anyway.

Context variables

These values are available as template variables:
  • uuid
  • userIp
  • vcluster
  • user
  • clientId
  • gatewayIp
  • gatewayHost
  • gatewayVersion
  • apiKey
  • apiKeyVersion
  • timestampMillis
Context variables resolve relative to the path the Interceptor runs on. With target: CONSUME or BOTH, clientId, user, userIp and vcluster describe the consumer rather than the producer, and apiKey is Fetch instead of Produce. Gateway regenerates uuid and timestampMillis on every fetch, so each read of the same record gets different values.
When Gateway sits behind a load balancer, userIp resolves to the original client address only when Gateway captures it. Otherwise, it’s the load balancer’s address.

Record extraction templates

You can also extract fields from the record key or value:
  • {{record.key}} - extract the entire key payload as a string
  • {{record.value}} - extract the entire value payload as a string
  • {{record.key.fieldName}} - extract a specific field from the record key
  • {{record.value.fieldName}} - extract a specific field from the record value
For example, if your record has a key with a field named “id”, you can use {{record.key.id}} to extract that value and inject it as a header.
To use field extraction (record.key.fieldName or record.value.fieldName) with Avro, JSON Schema or Protobuf data, give the Interceptor a schema registry so Gateway can deserialize the records — either schemaRegistryConnectionName or schemaRegistryConfig. For plain JSON data, no schema registry is needed.

Configure header injection Interceptor

Error handling

The failOnError setting controls how the Interceptor handles errors during header injection, such as a missing field or a payload it can’t deserialize. If target is CONSUME or BOTH, we recommend leaving failOnError at false. To fail produce requests but only log on consume, use two Interceptors with different names: one with target: PRODUCE and failOnError: true, and one with target: CONSUME and failOnError: false.

Header injection Interceptor example

Let’s produce a simple record to the injectHeaderTopic topic.
Let’s consume from our injectHeaderTopic.
You should see the message with headers as below

Message integrity Interceptor

The message integrity Interceptor signs Kafka records on produce and verifies them on fetch, letting consumers detect whether a record changed after it was produced. Two plugins work together:
  • ProduceIntegrityPolicyPlugin signs records using HMAC-SHA256 through Google Tink.
  • FetchIntegrityPolicyPlugin verifies signatures and drops or allows records based on your policy.
You store signing keys in your HashiCorp Vault Key-Value (KV) v2 instance. Gateway reads and caches them locally.

Ordering with other Interceptors

The message integrity Interceptor is always the outermost layer — signing runs last on produce (after all other Interceptors have transformed the record) and verification runs first on fetch (before any normal Interceptor runs). This ensures the signature covers the final produced payload and is verified before any transformation on consume. Gateway enforces this ordering automatically. You don’t have to set specific priority values for integrity Interceptors — Gateway places them in fixed pipeline positions regardless of their configured priority:
  • Produce: the sign plugin always runs after all other Interceptors.
  • Fetch: the verify plugin always runs before all other Interceptors.
Gateway also validates that two integrity Interceptors of the same type don’t have overlapping scopes (Virtual Cluster, group or username). If they do, Gateway rejects the configuration. The Interceptor reads Vault credentials only from its config. You have to specify credential fields (such as token, roleId or secretId) in the config. You can set their values with placeholders like token: "${VAULT_TOKEN}", which Gateway resolves when it loads the config. Gateway does not fall back to environment variable names when you omit a credential field (for example, there is no built-in fallback to VAULT_TOKEN if you leave out token).
When Vault is unreachable (for example, on a cache miss), Gateway propagates the error to the Kafka client: producers receive the failure on produce and consumers receive it on fetch. Gateway does not silently drop records in these cases.

Configure the secretKeyUri

secretKeyUri points to a specific field in a KV v2 secret. Use the format <mount>/data/<path>#<fieldName>. Examples: secret/data/signing-key#key, secret/data/app/keys/signing#hmacKey.

Manage key versions in Vault KV v2

Vault KV v2 versions secrets: each write to the same path creates a new version. Gateway handles versions as follows:
  • Produce (sign): Gateway uses the latest version of the secret at the path you configured. When you write a new value to that path in Vault, Gateway picks it up once the cache entry expires (see cache.ttlMs). Each signed record stores the key version in its signature header.
  • Fetch (verify): The signature on each record identifies the key version used to sign it. Gateway fetches that exact version from Vault to verify, so records signed with an older version still verify correctly after you rotate to a newer version.
  • Older versions: Keep older secret versions readable in Vault until you no longer need to verify records signed with them (for example, until they are consumed or past your retention period).

Configure produce (sign) plugin

If a record already has the signature header, the Interceptor throws PolicyViolationException and does not re-sign.

Configure fetch (verify) plugin

Gateway drops records that fail verification (missing signature, malformed header or invalid MAC (Message Authentication Code)) and emits an audit event. After successful verification, Gateway removes the signature header from the record before returning it to the consumer. For other errors (such as Vault being unreachable on a cache miss), Gateway propagates the error to the Kafka client and does not silently drop the record. When a record is dropped or allowed with missing signature, the fetch (verify) plugin emits a fetch response audit event (error level). To receive these events, enable the audit feature with GATEWAY_FEATURE_FLAGS_AUDIT (see Audit logs and Environment variables). Audit event details:
  • Event type: fetch response audit event (level: error)
  • Information included: topic, partition, offset, Interceptor name, plugin name (FetchIntegrityPolicyPlugin) and a message describing the reason
  • Reason values: missing_signature (no signature header), malformed_signature (header could not be decoded), verification_failed:INVALID_SIGNATURE (MAC does not match) or verification_failed:UNKNOWN_KEY (key version not found in Vault)

Authenticate with Vault for message integrity

All auth types use the common fields: uri (required) and optionally namespace, openTimeoutSeconds (default five), readTimeoutSeconds (default 30), keyStore, trustStore and connectionBackoff. Set type to one of the following and add the corresponding fields. You can also configure TLS for the Vault connection:
  • keyStore: set keyStorePath and keyStorePassword for client certificate authentication
  • trustStore: set trustStorePath and trustStorePassword to verify the Vault server certificate
All auth types except TOKEN support automatic token renewal. Gateway renews Vault tokens in the background so your Interceptor continues to work without interruption. Optional connectionBackoff (for transient Vault failures): backoffDelay (default five), backoffMaxDelay (default 30), backoffChronoUnit (default SECONDS), backoffDelayFactor (default 1.1).

Set up Vault for message integrity

  1. Enable KV v2: vault secrets enable -version=2 kv
  2. Create a signing key for HMAC-SHA256:
    • The key material has to be at least 32 bytes (256 bits) after decoding. Gateway enforces this per NIST SP 800-107 Rev 1 and rejects shorter keys with an error.
    • Store the key in a KV v2 secret as a base64-encoded string. Gateway decodes the Base64 value and uses the resulting bytes, so the decoded length has to be at least 32 bytes.
    • The field name in the secret has to match the <fieldName> in your secretKeyUri (for example, secret/data/signing-key#key uses field name key).
    • Example: generate 32 random bytes, base64-encode them for storage, then write to Vault: KEY=$(openssl rand -base64 32) then vault kv put -mount=secret signing-key key="$KEY"
  3. Create a policy for Gateway with read access on the secret path (for example, path "secret/data/signing-key" { capabilities = ["read"] })

Understand the signature format

Gateway stores each signature in a Kafka header as JSON with two fields: k = the secretKeyUri with its version (for example, secret/data/signing-key#key@1) and s = the base64-encoded HMAC-SHA256 MAC.

Message integrity Interceptor examples

Apply with: conduktor apply -f integrity-sign-interceptor.yaml and conduktor apply -f integrity-verify-interceptor.yaml.

Encryption Interceptors

Gateway encrypts your Kafka data as it passes through the proxy, before it reaches the broker. Unlike TLS (Transport-Level Encryption), Gateway encryption ensures data remains encrypted when stored on Kafka brokers. The section covers all of the configuration options available for every encryption Interceptor. You can also check out other resources:

Encryption configuration

The properties detailed in this section work for the following plugins: Both schema-based and list-based encryption plugins have their configuration, but some properties are common to both of them.

List-based

Decide what you want to encrypt:
  • Record value and record key:
    • Encrypt a set of fields
    • Encrypt the full payload
  • or header keys:
    • Encrypt a set of fields
    • Encrypt the full payload
    • Encrypt a set of headers that match a regex
Record values and record keys Set the following properties for recordValue (value encryption) and/or recordKey (key encryption): Check out the encryption examples. Header keys Set the following properties for recordHeader: Check out the encryption example.

Schema-based

In order to encrypt your data, you can set a few constraints in your schema. These constraints are detailed below, assuming you’re using the default namespace value which is conduktor.​. If you have changed the namespace value in the Interceptor configuration, please change the key name in your schema accordingly. If your field meets one of these three conditions, then it will be encrypted:
  1. This field has a keySecretId set in the schema
  2. This field has a algorithm set in the schema
  3. This field has a set of tags set in the schema, and one of them is part of the tags list specified in the Interceptors.
Configure the KMS inline for schema-based encryption. A KMS external connection doesn’t yet honor per-field keys from a schema.
Check out the encryption example.

Secret keys

Mustache template In all the encryption plugins, you can use mustache templates for the key an entry names — keySecretId inline, or keyId when the Interceptor names a KMS external connection. That way, your keys are dynamic.
The value of a field will be replaced with the encrypted value; so using the keyId as the encryption value isn’t allowed.
Here’s a record example:
Both fields take the same templates. Where the resulting key lives depends on how the Interceptor reaches its KMS:
The connection already knows the provider, so this creates a key called myTopic-myHeader-myKey in that KMS.

KMS integration

An encryption entry names its key in one of two ways, depending on how its Interceptor reaches the KMS: Set one or the other on an entry, never both. Both accept mustache templates.
Every entry has to carry the field matching the Interceptor’s own choice, and carry it non-blank. Gateway rejects the rest when you create or update the Interceptor, naming which field to use.

Supported algorithms

  • AES128_GCM (default)
  • AES128_EAX
  • AES256_EAX
  • AES128_CTR_HMAC_SHA256
  • AES256_CTR_HMAC_SHA256
  • CHACHA20_POLY1305
  • XCHACHA20_POLY1305
  • AES256_GCM

Choosing an encryption algorithm

Gateway supports multiple encryption algorithms, with AES128_GCM as the default. When selecting an algorithm, consider your security requirements, performance needs, and message volume. Default algorithm: AES128_GCM AES128_GCM is the default algorithm and is suitable for most use cases. However, it has an important security limitation:
Security consideration: When the same DEK (Data Encryption Key) is used to encrypt approximately 4 billion (2³²) messages, AES-GCM’s security guarantees degrade due to nonce collision risks. According to NIST Special Publication 800-38D (Section 8.3), nonce collisions may expose encryption keys, compromising the confidentiality and integrity of data encrypted with that key.For high-traffic scenarios, this threshold can be reached quickly. For example:
  • At 10-50MB/s with 1KB message sizes, the 4-billion-message threshold can be reached in just over 24 hours
  • Each unique keySecretId uses its own DEK, so the limit applies per key, not globally
If you expect a single DEK to encrypt more than ~2³² messages, consider:
  • Using a different algorithm (see recommendations below)
  • Implementing DEK rotation before reaching the threshold
  • Using multiple keySecretId values to distribute the message count across multiple DEKs
When to keep the default (AES128_GCM)
  • Low to moderate message volume per DEK (well below 2³² messages per key)
  • Need for compatibility with existing AES-GCM implementations
  • Hardware acceleration (AES-NI) is available, providing good performance
If you expect a single DEK to encrypt more than ~2³² messages, consider using alternative algorithms or implementing DEK rotation. Consult your cryptographic library documentation and security requirements to choose the appropriate algorithm for your use case.

Key rotation

Gateway uses envelope encryption with two types of keys: DEK (Data Encryption Key) and KEK (Key Encryption Key). Understanding how and when to rotate these keys is important for maintaining security. KEK rotation
Customer responsibility: KEK (Key Encryption Key) rotation must be performed by the customer and is not handled automatically by Gateway. This is the customer’s responsibility and must be done through your KMS provider (AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, HashiCorp Vault, GCP KMS, etc.).
When to rotate KEK You should rotate your KEK based on:
  • Security policies: Follow your organization’s key rotation policies and compliance requirements
  • DEK encryption frequency: If DEKs are being encrypted frequently (high message volume), consider more frequent KEK rotation
  • Security incidents: Rotate immediately if a KEK is suspected to be compromised
  • Best practices: Many organizations rotate KEKs annually or quarterly, but the frequency should match your security requirements
After rotating a KEK, Gateway will automatically use the new KEK version for encrypting new DEKs. However, existing EDEKs encrypted with the old KEK version will still be de-cryptable as long as the old KEK version remains available in your KMS.Most KMS providers retain old key versions for backward compatibility, allowing you to decrypt historical data while new data uses the rotated key.

Supported compression types

  • none
  • gzip
  • snappy
  • lz4
  • zstd

Encryption error policy

This policy determines the actions when an encryption Interceptor encounters a record that’s already encrypted. Example configuration with error policy:

Tokenization

Tokenization replaces a sensitive value with an unrelated token, and keeps the mapping in Vault rather than in your Kafka record. A team can work with the tokenized field without the values ever leaving Vault.
Tokenization only works with the Transform Secrets Engine, available in Vault Enterprise. No other KMS provider supports it for now, but we would love to hear from you.
Gateway calls the Transform role named in your keySecretId and writes the token it gets back into the record. Vault owns the behavior, so create the role with the tokenization transformation, which is the configuration Gateway is tested against:
With this transformation, Vault stores a mapping of the token to the encrypted plaintext, and the token carries no link to the original value, so it isn’t format-preserving.

When to use tokenization

Tokenization fits when a team has to work with the data rather than just move it: reporting on unique customer counts, or joining datasets on a customer reference. It’s a weaker fit when the same clear text can reach the same place as the tokens. Tokens are deterministic, so anyone holding a clear value and its token learns every other record carrying that value. If you can’t guarantee clear text stays out, use non-deterministic field level encryption instead. See choose how to protect your data for the full comparison.

Configure tokenization

Tokenization uses the existing encryption Interceptors (EncryptPlugin, DecryptPlugin and so on). To tokenize data, use the encryption Interceptors with a vault-transform:// prefix in your keySecretId. To de-tokenize and retrieve the original values, use the decryption Interceptors with the same configuration. See how to configure Vault. Here’s a sample field configured for tokenization:
Configure the KMS inline for tokenization. A KMS external connection only reaches Vault’s Transit engine, so it can’t use the Transform engine tokenization relies on. Set kmsConfig on the Interceptor rather than kmsConnectionName.

Decryption configuration

Now that your fields or payload are encrypted, you can decrypt them using the Interceptor DecryptPlugin.

Decryption error policy

This policy determines the action if there is an error during decryption.

KMS configuration

An encrypt or decrypt Interceptor reaches its KMS in one of two ways: Set one or the other, never both — Gateway rejects a configuration with both rather than silently picking one. See how each names its keys.

Configuration properties

Name a KMS external connection

KMS external connections are a preview feature and subject to change. Inline kmsConfig supports more providers, keeps working and isn’t deprecated — see which providers are available as an external connection.
Instead of a kmsConfig block, an encryption or decryption Interceptor can name a KMS external connection declared once when Gateway starts. The address, credentials and engine live in one place, so rotating a Vault credential is a single edit rather than one per Interceptor.

Configure a KMS inline

Set a kmsConfig block on the Interceptor, holding one or more providers from the catalogue below. Each Interceptor carries its own copy of the address and credentials. Each key is named with a full URI in keySecretId. Any that doesn’t match one of the schemas detailed below will be rejected and the encryption operation will fail.
Keys are strings that start with a letter followed by a combination of letters, underscores (_), hyphens (-) and numbers. Special characters are not allowed.They also work with the mustache pattern.
To make sure the key is created in your KMS, configure the provider in kmsConfig and use the matching format:
Vault appears twice because encryption and tokenization use two different HashiCorp modules. vault-kms:// uses the Transit Engine and encrypts. vault-transform:// uses the Transform Secrets Engine, available in Vault Enterprise only, and tokenizes. Having one doesn’t give you the other.
In-memory and test-tokenization modes are for testing and development purposes only. Test tokenization also requires GATEWAY_FEATURE_FLAGS_TEST_TOKENIZATION to be set to TRUE
If not specified, vault KMS scheme defaults to https. This means that vault-kms://https://vault:8200/transit/keys/password-key-id and vault-kms://vault:8200/transit/keys/password-key-id are identical.
Keys are strings that start with a letter followed by a combination of letters, underscores (_), hyphens (-) and numbers. Special characters are not allowed. Keys also work with the Mustache pattern described above.

Choose your KMS provider

In-memory KMS

This should not be used on production data.
Keys in in-memory KMS are not persisted, this means that if you do one of the following, you won’t be able to decrypt old records, losing the data.
  • Use a Gateway cluster with more than a single node or
  • restart Gateway or
  • change the Interceptor configuration

Gateway KMS

This KMS type is effectively a delegated storage model and is designed to support encryption use cases which generate unique secret Ids per record or even field (typically via the Mustache template support for a secret Id). This technique is used in crypto-shredding type scenarios e.g. encrypting records per user with their own key.It provides the option to leverage your KMS for security via a single master key, but efficiently and securely store many per-record level encryption keys (DEKs) in the Gateway managed store. For some architectures this can provide performance and cost savings for encryption use cases which generate a high volume of secret key Ids.The masterKeyId is used to secure every key for this configuration, stored by Gateway. Find out more about the secret key formats. You have to also supply a valid configuration for the KMS type referenced by the master key so this can be used.If this key is dropped from the backing KMS, then all keys stored by Gateway for that master key will become unreadable.Gateway KMS encryption exampleHere’s a sample configuration for the Gateway KMS using a Vault-based master key:
This can then be used to encrypt a field using gateway-kms:// as the secret key type:
When processing a record for the first time using this configuration, Gateway will:
  1. generate a DEK to encrypt the field data,
  2. turn it into an EDEK by encrypting with the masterKeyId secret from vault and
  3. store the EDEK in Gateway storage.
If a record key was 123456, the associated EDEK would be stored on a kafka record with the following key:
Multiple records produced against this config would cause multiple EDEKs to be saved in the Gateway storage (due to the {{record.key}} template giving a unique key for each Kafka record key).If there are multiple Gateway nodes running, it’s also possible for multiple DEKs/EDEKs to be generated for the same record key. Two nodes processing different records with the same record key at the same time could both assume they were generating a DEK/EDEK for the first time. In this scenario, there would be two EDEKs in the Gateway storage with the same keyId but they would each have a different UUID.For example:
Nonetheless, there will only ever be one master key stored in the vault KMS, which is used to encrypt every DEK.This feature provides flexibility for your KMS storage and key management setups - and is particularly useful for high volume crypto shredding.Decryption using Gateway KMSWhen using the gateway-kms secret key Id type, the decryption configuration used to decrypt the data has to also specify the masterKeyId, so that it can securely decrypt the keys stored in the local Gateway storage.Here’s a sample setup:
Crypto shreddingWhen using the gateway-kms secret key Id type, you can efficiently crypto shred EDEKs in the Gateway storage, so that anyone using the decryption plugin will immediately lose access to the associated encrypted data.To do this, scan the Gateway storage Kafka topic (by default, _conduktor_gateway_encryption_keys) for every message matching the associated qualified secret Id.For example, a qualified secretId of gateway-kms://fieldKeySecret-name-123456 might have the following keys:
Publishing a message for each of these keys back to the same topic with a value of null (i.e. a tombstone) will effectively perform Crypto Shredding.This process won’t prevent the creation of new keys if new messages are sent using the same record key; it only ensures that messages using the crypto shredded keys remain unrecoverable.

AWS KMS

To set your AWS KMS, include this section in your Interceptor config, below aws.You can use one of these two authentication methods:
  • basic authentication or
  • session.
Make sure to follow the right method and provided the correct properties. Omit both and Gateway falls back to the AWS SDK’s default credentials provider.Naming keys through an external connection. An AWS KMS external connection carries the region and account, so each keyId is a bare key name rather than an ARN. Gateway builds the ARN for you:
  • The partition comes from the region, so GovCloud, China and the ISO regions work without naming one.
  • An alias/<name> id is used as the ARN resource as-is, so it becomes …:<accountId>:alias/<name> rather than gaining a key/ prefix.
  • Anything else is rejected when you create or update the Interceptor, with AWS keyId '…' must be a key id or 'alias/<name>'; the region and account are part of connection <NAME>. Pasting a full ARN from the console is the usual cause.
For enhanced security, you can hide the sensitive values using environment variables as secrets.

Azure KMS

To set your Azure KMS, include this section in your Interceptor config, below azure.You can use one of these two authentication methods:
  • token or
  • username and password.
Make sure you’ve followed the right method, and that you’ve provided the correct properties.For enhanced security, you can hide the sensitive values using environment variables as secrets.

Fortanix KMS

To set your Fortanix KMS, include this section in your Interceptor config under fortanix:Alternatively, you can use the environment variables for sensitive credentials and configuration values. Set them in your Gateway deployment and they will be resolved at runtime. In that case, you don’t have to supply a Fortanix {} block in the KMS config.If the specified encryption key doesn’t exist in Fortanix DSM, Gateway will automatically create it with the following configuration:
  • Key type: AES symmetric key
  • Mode: CBC
  • Key Size: 256
  • Permissions: ENCRYPT, DECRYPT

Google Cloud Platform KMS

To set your Google Cloud Platform (GCP) KMS, include this section in your Interceptor config, under gcp:You must first configure the service account key file.For enhanced security, you can hide the sensitive values using environment variables as secrets.

Vault KMS

Gateway supports two data security backends for Vault:To configure Vault, add a new Vault section in your Interceptor configuration. For enhanced security, you can hide the sensitive values using the environment variables as secrets.TrustStore
When using HTTPS Vault URIs without an explicitly configured trust store, Gateway will attempt to use the VAULT_SSL_TRUST_STORE_PATH and VAULT_SSL_TRUST_STORE_PASSWORD environment variables if available.
KeyStore
The Vault client library requires that JKS key stores contain both a private key and client certificate with identical passwords. When using HTTPS Vault URIs without an explicitly configured key store, Gateway will attempt to use the VAULT_SSL_KEY_STORE_PATH and VAULT_SSL_KEY_STORE_PASSWORD environment variables if available.
Vault authentication typesExample:
Connection backoffIf there’s a connection failure (e.g., a network partition error), Gateway will automatically keep trying to reconnect to Vault.You can adjust this by modifying the kmsConfig.vault.connectionBackoff object:Example:
Configuring Vault Transit Secrets EngineHere’s the minimum Vault policy required for encryption and decryption to work with vault:// prefixed keys:
Configuring Vault Transform Secrets EngineHere’s the minimum Vault policy required for encryption and decryption to work with vault-transform:// prefixed keys,
When using the Vault transform secrets engine, you can configure additional caching using the kmsConfig.vault.transformEngineCache object:Example:

Client throttling configuration

When encryption or decryption operations fail, you can configure client throttling to help protect your system from being overwhelmed during error conditions. To enable client throttling, set the throttleTimeMs parameter in your encryption/decryption Interceptor config:
  • throttleTimeMs = 0 (default): no throttling - clients receive immediate error responses
  • throttleTimeMs > 0: clients will be throttled for the specified time in milliseconds when operations fail
When throttleTimeMs is configured with a value greater than 0:
  • cluster stability is protected: Gateway automatically throttles clients to prevent system overload
  • client compliance is built-in: Kafka clients automatically pause for the specified throttle time between requests
  • failure cascades are prevented: throttling reduces retry pressure, allowing brokers to recover
Configuration example: